It was just over twenty years ago when Herman and Chomsky developed their propaganda model to analyze how information and communications systems are controlled in seemingly “free” political contexts – i.e. capitalist societies, in juxtaposition with the monopolistic Eastern Bloc. A true sign of the times, anticommunist ideology was even listed as a mechanism for manipulating media content in the West. Since then, the world has become far less polarized; however, many former Soviet nations have resisted full democratization, clinging to the political and economic practices of their fallen empire.
One country of particular interest is Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian nation of 5.5 million once touted as being the most liberal post-Soviet government in its region. Since the bloody 2010 revolution leading to the overthrow of President Bakiyev, however, it has become clear that such an approbation is no longer applicable. The state has become increasingly oppressive and totalitarian, relying more on Soviet style clientele networks, patronage systems, and plain old bribery. And yet, in some ways, it is still trying to uphold its image as a free society. A prominent example of this conflict was exemplified by the new government’s attempt in the spring of 2010 to recast the state television channel, Obschestvennaya Tele-Radio Kompaniya (OTRK) as a publicly-run institution, outside of government control. While initially lauded, it is doubtful that OTRK’s fragile foundation will be able to withstand the political and economic pressures precipitated by the impending presidential election in October, 2011. Moreover, on September 25th, the Kyrgyz government placed a ban on all live foreign news broadcasts for the duration of the election period, ostensibly to prevent interference from the Kremlin in its former satellite’s internal affairs.
The Kyrgyz case is a clear manifestation of Chakravatty and Zhao’s (2007) “friction” metaphor, which describes globalization as a rocky path ridden with “diverse and conflicting social encounters” (13). In Kyrgyzstan, these tensions exist primarily between those seeking to build a more democratic media industry (journalists, media activists, and transnational NGOs, etc.) against the government officials that are attempting to maintain the status quo. Other sources of friction are found in the structural and cultural vestiges of Soviet rule. Kyrgyzstan’s political culture is characterized by corruption and bribery, and the concept of public broadcasting is not readily espoused by those accustomed to the state’s monopoly. Structurally, the government lacks the necessary judicial and law-enforcement reforms to counteract these malfeasances, and the poor funding of media outlets leads many journalists to work in political PR, rather than remain nonpartisan in their reports.
What happens when an entire nation is being pulled in opposite directions – outwards toward democratization and globalization, and inwards toward the political and economic structures of its past? Is it even possible for the Kyrgyz government to prevent foreign news infiltration, given that the ban does not account for satellite channels, let alone online media sources? In any case, the outcome of this election will undoubtedly have great impact on Kyrgyzstan’s national development, its path to modernization and integration into the global political economy.